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RICO

Is This The End of Civil RICO?
by Randolph N.Jonakait

Sedima, S.P.R.L.
V.

Imrex Co., Inc.
(Docket No. 84-648)
American National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago
V.

Haroco, Inc.
(Docket No.84-822)
Both Argued April 17, 1985
While these two cases, argued in succession on the
same lay, raise seemingly technical questions as to who
can sue or be stied civilly under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18
U.S.C. sections 1961-1968), the future of civil RICO is
really at stake. As more and more well-established businesses find themselves defendants in civil RICO cases,
controversy about the statute has mushroomed. Powerful interests, as indicated by the list of amid, will be
affected by the outcome of these cases.
Section 1962 of the RICO statute makes it illegal for
a person to conduct the affairs, or participate directly or
indirectly in the conduct of the affairs, of a business or
other enterprise "through a pattern of racketeering activity." RICO defines "racketeering activity" as any act
that is "chargeable" as certain serious state felonies or
any act that is "indictable" under a list of federal
crimes-including the prohibitions on the fraudulent
sale of sectirities and on the use of the telephones and
mails in fraudulent activities. In RICO parlance, racketeering activities are called "predicate acts." A "pattern
of racketeering activity" requires the commission of at
least two predicate acts within a ten-year period. Civil
RICO provides that any person injured in business or
property "by reason of a violation of section 1962," that
is, by reason of a person conducting a company's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity, can collect
treble damages from the offending party.
ISSUES
1. Does civil RICO reqtiire that a person be criminally
convicted of a predicate act before being stied for
damages?
Randolph N. Jonakait is a Professor at New York Law School,
57 Worth Street, New York, NY 10013; telephone (212) 4312883.
Issue No. 17

2. What kind of injuries must a person suffer to sue
under RICO? Are injuries stemming from the predicate acts sufficient or must the damages be something
in addition to and distinct fron the predicate act
injuries?
FACTS
Sedima v. Imrex: Sedima, a Belgian corporation,
joined with linrex, based in Great Neck, New York, to
furnish missile parts to NATO. The two agreed to divide profits from thejoint venture. Sedima negotiated in
Europe for the sale of' the parts and Imrex obtained
them in the United States. As part of the venture's
accounting procedures, Imrex was to send Sedima the
purchase orders indicating the actual prices for the parts
obtained.
Sedima claimed, however, that Gidon Armon, the
president of Imrex, and his son Jacob, another officer of
the company, sent fake orders that overstated the actual
prices. For example, according to Sedima, Inrex bought
certain transistors for $4.83 a piece, told Sedima that it
had paid $5.25, and pocketed the extra forty-two cents.
The profits of the joint venture were based on the inflated, fake costs. Sedima states that it got less money
than it should have while Inrex received its share of
profits plus the amount by which the Armons overstated
the costs of the materials. Sedima sued Imrex under
RICO, alleging that Imrex sent the fake orders through
the mails, thereby committing the indictable acts of mail
fraud.
The federal court for the Eastern District of New
York dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed that dismissal on two
grounds (741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984). The court held
that before a person can be sued civilly under RICO, he
or she must first have been convicted of a predicate act.
Neither the Armons or Imrex has been so convicted.
The Second Circuit also held that the complaint was
insufficient because Sediina only alleged injury from the
commission of the predicate acts. The court stated that
to collect tinder civil RICO, a plaintiff must demonstrate
injury "different in kind" from predicate act injuryinjury caused "by an activity which RICO was designed
to deter." In RICO terms, the court held that Sedima
failed to allege the necessary "RICO injury."
American National Bank v. Haroco: Haroco and its
related companies borrowed money from Chicago's
American National Bank (ANB). The loan agreements
pegged the interest charges to the prime rate, defined as
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the interest ANB charged its largest and most creditworthy borrowers. Haroco maintains that ANB, acting
through Ronald J. Grayheck, an officer and director of
ANB, and others, misrepresented that prime rate and
thereby collected excessive interest payments. Haroco
brought a civil RICO suit claiming that the misrepresentations were fraudulent activities and that the defendants committed a pattern of racketeering activities
by using the mails in this scheme.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the complaint because Haroco failed to
allege a RICO injury distinct from the predicate act
injuries. The Seventh Circuit reversed this dismissal and
held that a plaintiff does not have to allege or prove a
separate RICO injury for a valid suit. Damages from the
commission of the predicate acts, the court stated, are
sufficient for a valid RICO claim.
Thus, the Seventh and Second Circuits are in conflict
as to whether a RICO injury must be established for a
civil RICO claim. In addition, the Second Circuit has
imposed a prior conviction requirement into RICO.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
In 1970, Congress, to attack the financial base of
organized crime and to deter organized crime's infiltration of legitimate businesses, passed RICO-a statute
with severe criminal sanctions in addition to the civil
remedies at issue in the two argued cases. Congress
realized that it could not devise acceptable definitions to
outlaw "organized crime;" that term does not even appear in the statute. Instead, Congress adopted the "pattern of racketeering" approach. The result was a
broadly worded statute with a potential reach far beyond what is usually thought of as organized crime.
In its first decade, RICO was largely confined to
criminal prosecutions. The last few years, however, have
seen the filing of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of civil
RICO complaints. This explosion has been controversial. The controversy has centered on tile use of RICO in
commercial disputes concerning allegations of business
fraud. Plaintiffs, including states and localities, have
found it relatively easy to allege a RICO violation in such
situations. The two cases here represent typical complaints. A person claims to be injured from a commercial
misrepresentation, then states that two telephone calls
or two mailings were made in connection with the misrepresentations and that the person making the calls or
signing the letters conducted the affairs of the business.
The injured person then contends that such facts entitle
him or her to treble damages under RICO.
Critics of such suits state that this is a misuse of the
statute. RICO provides extraordinary remedies to attack
organized crime, and these claims have nothing to do
with organized crime. Instead, they are merely commercial disputes brought against "respectable" businesses.
Treble damages in these commercial disputes would be
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an unnecessary windfall to plaintiffs-actual damages
should be the measure of the award. Furthermore, some
commentators maintain that these actions are burdening
the already burdened federal judiciary since they federalize many disputes that otherwise would be heard in
state courts. Finally, the complaints are especially loud
about the unfairness of these suits. A jury verdict for
plaintiffs would, in effect, label the defendants "racketeers." This label is so repulsive to legitimate, respected
business people, it is claimed, that they will settle weak or
specious claimsjust to avoid the bad publicity that would
result from being found a "racketeer" or even being
tried as one.
The lower federal courts have shown a distinct hostility to RICO suits stemming from commercial disputes,
which form the bulk of the civil RICO cases. At stake in
these two cases are two court-imposed requirements that
could make it all but impossible to bring most civil RICO
suits in the future.
The Prior Conviction Requirement: The Supreme
Court will effectively kill civil RICO if it adopts the prior
conviction requirement. Prosecutions for fraud stemming from commercial disputes are now practically nil,
and potential plaintiffs cannot force prosecutors to prosecute. Since prosecutorial priorities are unlikely to
change as a result of the decisions in these cases, a prior
conviction barrier will almost always be insurmountable.
RICO Injury Requirement: Section 1962 of RICO,
according to Imrex and others urging a narrow construction, only forbids certain patterns of racketeering
activity. A plaintiff can only collect for injuries that
occur "by reason of a violation of section 1962." Thus, a
plaintiff must demonstrate harm not from the predicate
acts themselves, but from the use of the pattern in the
proscribed fashion; in these cases, the use of a racketeering pattern to conduct a business. Since Sedima only
alleged injuries that flowed from the predicate acts, it
did not state a valid RICO claim.
Sedima and Haroco maintain that the statute contains no express RICO injury requirement; if Congress
had intended it, it would have said so. Similarly, those
advocating a broad reading of RICO state that a plaintiff
only has to demonstrate harm by a defendant's predicate acts in a prohibited fashion to satisfy the statute's
requirement of a "pattern of racketeering activity."
Complexity is added to this issue because those who
agree that predicate act injury is not sufficient for a
RICO claim do not agree on what kind of injury would
satisfy the statute. Imrex and a number of amici see
RICO limited to "racketeering enterprise injury," and
argue that RICO was designed to attack organized
crime. Therefore, RICO injury is the kind that is characteristic of organized crime or "mobster" activity.
Sedima and Haroco counter that the statute says
nothing about conduct characteristic of organized
crime, gangsters, or mobsters. Congress knew that to
PREVIEW

reach organized crime, it had to pass a broad statute that
would reach more than organized crime. Furthermore,
the attempts to define conduct characteristic of organized crime are so vague and meaningless that Congress
could not have intended such a requirement.
Finally, American National Bank, although it argued
for a RICO injury requirement in the Seventh Circuit,
shifts its position in the Supreme Court. It contends not
that RICO injury must be proved, but instead that a
person violates RICO only by committing a pattern of
racketeering activity in connection with the management or direction of the enterprise. RICO only prohibits
a pattern of racketeering when itis used as an integral
part of the business. If the predicate acts are merely
incidental to the enterprise's affairs, RICO has not been
violated.
ANB's position seems to have the least chance of
success before the Supreme Court. Not only was it not
argued in the lower courts, it also presents the most
unforeseeable consequences since it would affect criminal as well as civil RICO.
The consequences of adopting a "RICO injury" requirement by the Court are more foreseeable. Such a
ruling will kill, or at least severely cripple, the present
civil RICO. If the Court adopts a competitive injury
requirement, civil RICO will, in effect, be gunned down.
Few, if any, competitors have sued under RICO, and
only in unusual circumstances will competitors be able to
establish that they were harmed by a pattern of racketeering activity. Instead, the existing suits are almost all
by victims of the predicate acts, who would be barred
from RICO suits under a competitive injury requirement.
The Supreme Court could also conclude that a plaintiff must establish injury in addition to and distinct from
predicate act injury without defining further what kind
of injury will satisfy civil RICO. Such a decision would
lead to more litigatioa as the lower courts are forced to
grapple further with a definition of RICO injury.
If the Supreme Court adopts neither the prior conviction nor the RICO injury requirement, the explosion
of civil RICO suits will continue. The attempts to limit
such claims will not end, however. The main battlefield
will then become Congress.

ForImrex (Counsel of Record, Alfred Weintrauband Richard
Eisenberg, 1010 Franklin Avenue, Garden City, NY 11530;
telephone (516) 742-0610)
1. The clear purpose of the RICO statute, and its treble
damages provision, was to attack organized crime and
protect the victims of organized crime.
2. Congress intended to authorize damages suits only in
circumstances where, in view of the particular kind of
injury suffered, it is clear that civil enforcement
would be consonant with the overriding goal of fighting "organized crime."
3. The structure of the RICO statute reveals that Congress expected civil suits to be brought only after
defendants have been convicted of the underlying
predicate acts.

ARGUMENTS
ForSedima (Counsel of Record, Franklyn H. Snitow and William
H. Pauley, 415 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10017; telephone (212) 486-9080)
1. The judicially-forged prohibition against civil RICO
claims absent predicate act convictions is an impermissible infringement on legislative authority.
2. A requirement of "mobster"-type injury for a civil
RICO claim is an impermissible infringement on
legislative authority.

In Support oflmrex and American National Bank
The American Bankers Association; the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants; four property
and casualty insurance trade associations with State
Farm Insurance in one brief; and the Securities Industries Association. (The Securities Industry, in addition to
advocating a RICO injury requirement, argues that at a
minimum, no RICO claims should be allowed in areas
where narrowly drawn federal statutes pervasively regulate a field, such as securities.)

Issue No. 17

ForAmerican NationalBank (Counsel of Record, DonaldE.
Egan, 55 E. Monroe Street, Chicago, IL 60603; telephone
(312)346-7400)
1. Section 1962(c) of RICO is only violated when the
pattern of racketeering activity committed by a person is integrally linked with managing and operating
an enterprise's affairs.
For Haroco (Counsel of Record, Aram A. Hartunian,55 E.
Monroe Street, Chicago, IL 60603; telephone (312) 3726475)
1. The district court's requirement of something more
than harm resulting from the predicate acts injected
unintended words and meanings into RICO.
2. The arguments of both ANB and amicus American
Bankers Association advocating a racketeering enterprise injury requirement are incorrect and not properly before this Court.

AMICI BRIEFS
Thirty-four states have joined together in a brief in
each case; New York State in a separate brief; the cities
of Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia have joined
together in a brief in each case; Suffolk County, New
York; the Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile
Club of Southern California; and John Grado and Technographics, Inc. in a joint brief. (Grado and Technographics are plaintiffs in a pending RICO suit.)
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